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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
SECURE IMAGE PROCESSING
In todays heterogeneous network environment, there is a growing de-
mand for distrusted parties to jointly execute distributed algorithms on
private data whose secrecy needed to be safeguarded. Platforms that
support such computation on image processing purposes are called
secure image processing protocols. In this thesis, we propose a new se-
curity model, called quasi information theoretic (QIT) security. Under
the proposed model efficient protocols on two basic image processing
algorithms – linear filtering and thresholding – are developed. For both
problems we consider two situations: 1) only two parties are involved
where one holds the data and the other possesses the processing algo-
rithm; 2) an additional non-colluding third party exists. Experiments
show that our proposed protocols improved the computational time
significantly compared with the classical cryptographical couterparts
as well as providing reasonable amount of security as proved in the
thesis.
KEYWORDS: Communication system security, Image Processing, Dis-
tributed Algorithms, Cryptography, Secure Multiparty Computation
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The proliferation of imaging and storage devices and the ubiquitous
presence of computer networks make sharing of digital data easier than
ever. Such casual exchange of data, however, has increasingly raised
questions on how sensitive information can be protected. Consider
the scenario in which a user of a cellular-phone camera wants to send
his/her pictures to an online photo-processing laboratory for image
enhancement such as red-eye removal. The user would be concerned
about the privacy of his/her pictures while the online store would need
to protect the proprietary enhancement technologies against reverse-
engineering. Consider another scenario that a law enforcement agency
wants to search for possible suspects in a surveillance video owned
by private company A, using a proprietary software from yet another
private company B. The three parties involved (agency, company A,
company B) all have information they do not want to share with each
other (criminal biometric database from the agency, surveillance tape
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from company A and proprietary software from company B).
One way of solving this problem is the Trusted Computing (TC)
Platform where the software is executed in a secure memory space of
the client machine equipped with a cryptographic co-processor [34].
Besides the high cost of overhauling the existing PC platform, the TC
concept remains highly controversial due to its unbalanced protection
of the software companies over the consumers [3]. To balance the pre-
tection for both the clients and the servers, another solution is then
proposed by establishing a joint computation and communication plat-
form that can guarantee the secrecy of private data and algorithms,
and at the same time achieve a well-defined objective that benefits all
parties involved. Platforms that provide security to the joint image
processing algorithms are called secure image processing protocols.
The secure joint computation aforementioned is, however, not a new
problem. Such type of secure computation in a distributed environ-
ment is a well-known problem in cryptography, and is referred to as
the Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) problem. The goal of a
SMC protocol is to allow multiple distrusted parties jointly compute a
function without complete sharing of their own information [15]. Like
many other cryptographic protocols, the security of SMC protocols
can be guaranteed under two different security models — information-
theoretical security and computational security. Information-theoretically
secure protocols protects privacy in such a way that the information ex-
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changed in the protocol provides no additional information, measured
in entropy, about the private data. In computationally secure pro-
tocols, private information is first transformed before transmitting to
other parties. The security is based on the huge computational burden
of performing the inverse transformation. Although the information-
theoretic security model provides the ideal level of security, it has been
shown that many simple operations like inner product or thresholding
cannot be securely computed between two distrusted parties [22]. As a
result, most existing SMC protocols are built under the computational
security model [38, 15, 4].
There has been little work in applying SMC to image processing
problems. The only work known to us is by S. Avidan et. al. [4] on
applying classical SMC protocols for two-party face detection. In a
typical classification task such as face detection, a significant portion
of an image is transformed into feature vectors, which in most cases
cannot be used to recover the original image. The manipulation of fea-
ture vectors is thus secure by definition and no special SMC protocols
are required. As a result, the complex SMC protocols do not signif-
icantly affect the overall performance of the classification task. On
the other hand, many common image processing applications require
pixel-by-pixel processing. The high compuational compexity of most
SMC protocols becomes a major drawback and hence useless when
applied to pixel level image processing algorithms. For example, the
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classical solution to the thresholding problem1, or comparing two pri-
vate numbers a and b, is to use Oblivious Transfer (OT) primitive [37]
– one party (Bob) creates a series of tables by bitwise comparing b with
every possible value of a, encrypts the tables using a public-key cipher,
and transfers them to Alice. Alice decrypts the entries in the tables
that correspond to his own number a and deduces the result. Most
public-key ciphers use modular exponentiations on very large finite
field which is complex to compute. As a result, it is difficult to scale
these protocols to signal processing applications that requires handling
a large amount of data and satisfying the real-time constraint.
As a result, it is imperative to develop fast computation techniques
for these applications. Among all image processing techniques, lin-
ear filtering and thresholding are arguably the most basic and useful
ones. As mathematically simple as they are, they have been used in
most of the complex and advanced image processing, computer vision
and pattern recognition applications such as enhancement, denoising,
halftoning, 3-D reconstruction and varies detection algorithms. Hence,
we focus in this thesis on solving the secure linear filtering and thresh-
olding problems only. Even though linear filtering by itself is inherently
insecure as we will demostrate in Section 1.3, we expect it when used
in combination with other types non-linear processing algorithms such
as thresholding to provide security.
1This problem is commonly referred to as the Secure Millionaire Problem in SMC literature.
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1.2 Contributions
Our major contribution in this thesis is the mathematical formation
of a new security model, called Quasi-Information-Theoretic (QIT) se-
curity model and the corresponding QIT linear filtering and threshold-
ing protocols which is a key step in building secure pattern recognition
applications. The proposed QIT secure model is a framework that
is expected to enable the development of more efficient secure image
processing protocols besides those developed in this theis. Hence, our
work could be deemed as an introduction to a relatively new inter-
disciplinary research area between security engineering and image pro-
cessing. The QIT model is a weaker form of information-theoretic
security. Its security is provided by using non-invertible transforma-
tions on private data. Though not explicitly defined, QIT-secure pro-
tocols have already been developed for inner product computation [11].
Compared with existing SMC protocols, our proposed linear filtering
protocol provides QIT security to both parties and our thresholding
protocol is more secure to one party (Alice) but not as secure to the
other (Bob) – Alice can deduce Bob’s number to be among n distinct
numbers spread through the entire range of the input. n is a design
parameter that can be changed based on the target level of security.
All our proposed protocols executes significantly faster than existing
protocols.
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1.3 Problem Description
In this section, we will introduce the problem definitions and some of
the notations used throughout this thesis. Specifically, we will explain
the reason for linear filtering to be inherently insecure.
1.3.1 Linear Filtering
Given an image {x(µ, ν) : 0 ≤ µ ≤ N1, 0 ≤ ν ≤ N2} and a
filtering operation f(·) described by a set of parameters Θ, we define
the output y(µ, ν) of applying this filter to x as follows:
y(t) = f(x; Θ) (1.1)
In the secure image filtering model, we have two parties, Alice and Bob,
who own the signal x and the filter parameter Θ respectively. Our goal
is to establish a computation protocol between Alice and Bob so that
1. Alice obtains f(x; Θ) without any knowledge of Θ, and
2. Bob does not know anything about x.
For linear filtering, the filter parameters are specified as a filter mask
h defined as {h(i, j) : − l12 ≤ i ≤
l1
2 , −
l2
2 ≤ j ≤
l2
2 }. The linear filtering
operation can then be written as
y(µ, ν) = x⊗ h =
l1/2
∑
i=−l1/2
l2/2
∑
j=−l2/2
h(i, j)x(µ− i, ν − j). (1.2)
6
It is easy to see that Equation (1.2) is a scalar product between two
(l1 + 1)(l2 + 1) dimensional vectors.
Our secure linear filtering protocol use the following conceptual
model: Alice first forms a N1N2 × (l1 + 1)(l2 + 1) matrix Xw whose
rows are the signal data needed for the inner product operation. The
total number of rows of Xw is the total number of pixels in the output
image2. If we denote the ith row of Xw as Xw(i, :), the output image as
a vector y = [y(1, 1) · · · y(N1, N2)]
T , and the filter mask as a vector
h = [h(− l12 ,−
l2
2 ) · · · h(
l1
2 ,
l2
2 )]
T , then the linear image filtering could
be written as
y = Xwh (1.3)
A secure linear filtering protocol decomposes every y(i) = Xw(i, :) · h
into y(i) = ya +yb such that Alice computes ya without any knowledge
of h and Bob computes yb without any knowledge of Xw(i, :).
If linear filtering is the end goal of the processing, Bob sends back
his portion to Alice to compute the output y. Using both the input x
and y, Alice can estimate h using the least square estimate
ĥ = (XTwXw)
−1Xwy.
In other words, linear filtering is intrinsically insecure to Bob no matter
how secure the protocol is. General non-linear filtering, on the other
hand, is much harder to invert based on limited number of input and
2X can be made to have N1N2 rows with appropriate boundary handling.
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output pairs. If linear filtering is used as part of a secure non-linear
processing system, it is thus important that neither Alice nor Bob has
the entire output of the linear filtering protocol.
1.3.2 Thresholding
Thresholding is secrete comparision, i.e. Alice holds a secret scaler
a, and Bob holds another secret scaler b. They want to find out who
has a bigger number without disclosing their private data. We propose
to convert this problem into a special polynomial evaluation problem.
Alice first randomly generate a (n − 1)th-degree real polynomial f(x)
such that (f(a) − f(b))(a − b) ≥ 0 for ∀a, b ∈ R. Without loss of
generality, let f(x) takes the form f(x) = an−1x
n−1 + · · · + a1x + a0.
Then it is straightforward to see that b is greater than a if and only if
f(b) > 0. Thus if Bob knows the value of f(b), he can easily solve the
problem without any knowledge of a. To compute f(b), we note that
f(b) can be computed as an inner product:
f(b) , an−1b
n−1 + · · ·+ a1b + a0 , x
T
1 x2 (1.4)
where x1 = [ an−1 · · · a1 a0 ]
T and x2 = [ b
n−1 · · · b 1 ]T .
At the end of the protocol, f(b) is separated into two parts f(b) =
ra + rb, where Alice holds the partial result ra and Bob holds the other
partial result rb. After the protocol, if Bob want to know whether his
number is larger, Alice needs to send her portion ra to Bob, and Bob
8
compute f(b). Bob can infer the relationship of a and b from the sign
of f(b)
Although the linear filtering protocol, whatever it is, is intrisically
insecure as discussed in Section 1.3.1, when we combine linear filter-
ing and thresholding together, such as in a denoising algorithm, this
problem will no longer exist. Since the partial outputs of the linear
filtering need not to be summed together to conduct a threholding.
Assume the threshold Bob has is t0, and the intention of thresholding
is to compare whether a + b is larger than t0 or not. This is the same
as compare a with t0 − b. Thus, what Bob needs to do is to substract
b from t0 and perform the thresholding protocol with Alice to find the
relationship between a + b and t0.
1.4 Organization Of The Thesis
The remaining chapters of the thesis is organized as follows: In
Chapter 2, we will review the exisiting related research work. We will
then introduce the existing security models before we mathematically
form the QIT security model of our own in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5,
the security of the proposed linear filtering and thresholding protocols
will be proved and comparison of the performance of our protocols with
existing SMC protocols will be shown in Chapter 6 together with a brief
discussion of several possible weak point of our protocols. Finally, the
thesis is concluded in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Related Research Work
In this chapter, we will review several related area about the secure
image processing project. One is the cryptographic counterpart, i.e.
the secure multiparty computation (SMC) and the oblivious transfer
(OT) primitive. Another is the previous work that have applied the
SMC protocols on image processing algorithms. The third is the ex-
isting research work on the protocols that satisfies our proposed quasi
information theoretic (QIT) security. We will review these in separated
sections.
2.1 SMC and OT
The general problem of secure multiparty computation (SMC) can
be traced back to the classical paper by Yao [37]. In that paper, he
introduced the millionaire problem and it was then further extended
by Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [16] and many others to form
the concept of SMC. In a general setting of a SMC protocol [15], we
have a given number of participants p1, p2, · · · , pN , each having a
10
private data, respectively d1, d2, · · · , dN . The participants want
to compute the value of a public function F on N variables at the
point (d1, d2, · · · , dN). A SMC protocol is dubbed secure if no
participant can learn more from the description of the public function
and the result of the global calculation than what he/she can learn
from his/her own entry - under particular conditions depending on the
model used.
There are basically two types of security models for a SMC protocol
as briefly introduced in Chapter 1. One is called computational secu-
rity, which is based on the hardness of some mathematical problem,
like factoring and discrete logarithm. The other one, unconditional
security which is often referred to as information theoretic security, is
usually with some probability of error which can be made arbitrar-
ily small. Different SMC protocols have been developed under both
models [8, 23, 29, 35]. The assumptions used in a SMC prtocol could
be that participants use a synchronised network (a message sent at a
“tick“ always arrives at the next “tick“), that a secure and reliable
broadcast channel exists, that a secure communication channel exists
between every pair of participants (an adversary cannot read, modify
or generate messages in the channel), etc.. The centrally controlled
adversary considered can be passive (only allowed to read the data
of a certain number of participants) or active (can corrupt the exe-
cution protocol or a certain number of participants). An adversary
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can be static (chooses its victims before the start of the multiparty
computation) or dynamic (can chose its victims during the course of
execution of the multiparty computation). Specially, the protocol is
said to be secure in a semi-honest environment if all parties respect
the protocol and are not able to derive more information than what
can be deduced fro mthe final results. While most of the SMC proto-
cols, including those descibed in this theis, are developed under this
assumption, there some work extending the assumption to malicious
environment when participants can do whatever to know as much as
possible [10, 18, 13, 9, 25].
One of the basic tools used in Perfectly Secure Multiparty Compu-
tation (PSMC) is secret sharing. A t-out-of-m secret-sharing scheme
breaks a secret number x into m shares r1, r2, . . . , rm such that x can-
not be reconstructed unless an adversary obtains more than t − 1
shares with t ≤ m. The importance of a secret-sharing scheme in
PSMC is illustrated by the following example: in a 2-party secure
computation of f(x1, x2), party Pi will use a 2-out-of-2 secret-sharing
scheme to break xi into ri1 and ri2, and share rij with party Pj. Each
party then computes the function using the shares received, resulting
in y1 , f(r11, r21) at P1 and y2 , f(r12, r22) at P2. If the secret sharing
scheme is homomorphic under the function f(), that is y1 and y2 are
themselves secret shares of the desired function f(x1, x2), f(x1, x2) can
then be easily computed by exchanging y1 and y2 between the two par-
12
ties. Under our computational model, all SMC problems can be solved
if the secret-sharing scheme is doubly homomorphic – it preserves both
addition and multiplication. Adi Shamir [31] invented such a t-out-
of-m scheme called Shamir’s Secrety Sharing scheme. In this scheme,
the secrete number x is hidden as the constant term of randomly gen-
erately polynomial of degree t − 1 and the values of the polynomial
evaluated at m different points are distributed among the m partici-
pating parties. To recover the secret, i.e. the constant term, at least t
parties need to share their information.
It is unsatisfactory that PSMC cannot even provide secure two-
party computation [22]. Instead of relying on perfect security, modern
cryptographical techniques primarily use the so-called computational
security model. Under this model, secrets are protected by encod-
ing them based on a mathematical function whose inverse is difficult
to compute without the knowledge of a secret key. Such a function
is called one-way trapdoor function and the concept is used in many
public-key cipher: a sender who wants to send a message m to party
P will first compute a ciphertext c = E(m, k) based on the publicly
known encryption algorithm E() and P ’s advertised public key k. The
encryption algorithm acts as a one-way trapdoor function because a
computationally-bounded eavesdropper will not be able to recover m
given only c and k. On the other hand, P can recover m by apply-
ing a decoding algorithm D(E(m, k), s) = m using her secret key s.
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Unlike perfectly secured protocols in which the adversary simply does
not have any information about the secret, the adversary in the com-
putationally secured model is unable to decrypt the secret due to the
computational burden in solving the inverse problem. Even though it is
still a conjecture that true one-way trapdoor functions exist and future
computation platforms like quantum computer may drastically change
the landscape of these functions, many one-way function candidates
exist and are routinely used in practical security systems 1.
One important SMC primitive under the computational security
model is oblivious transfer (OT), which is a protocol by which a sender
sends some information to the receiver, but remains oblivious as to
what is sent. The first form of oblivious transfer was introduced in
1981 by M. Rabin [30]. Even et al. [12] then extended the work and
developed a more useful form of OT, called “1 out of 2 oblivious trans-
fer“ and denoted by OT 21 , for the purpose of SMC. Later, the concept
of OT is further extended to “1 out of n oblivious tranfer“ denoted by
OT n1 in [28, 2]. Further work has revealed oblivious transfer to be a
fundamental and important problem in cryptography. It is considered
one of the critical problems in the field, because of the importance of
the applications that can be built based on it. In particular, it is a
‘complete’ for secure multiparty computation: that is given an imple-
mentation of oblivious transfer it is possible to securely evaluate any
polynomial time computable function without any additional primi-
1A list of one-way function candidates can be found in [17, ch.1].
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tive [21]. Because of the importance of OT in Cryptography as well
as in this thesis, the OT 21 protocol is detailed in Algorithm 1 [4] as an
example of OT.
Algorithm 1 OT21()
Require: Alice has σ ∈ {0, 1}, and Bob has two messages M0, M1.
1: Bob sends Alice two different public encryption keys K0, K1.
2: Alice generates a key K and encrypts it with K0 or K1 according to her σ.
Without loss of generality, let’s say σ = 1. She sends Bob E(K,K1), i.e. she
encrypts K with Bob’s K1 since σ = 1.
3: Bob does not know which public key Alice used, so he decrypts with both of his
private keys. He thus obtains both the real key K, and a bogus one K ′.
4: Bob sends Alice E(M0, K
′) and E(M1, K), in the SAME order he sent the keys
K0 and K1 in step 1. Alice decrypts the second of these messages with the key
K and obtains M1.
5: return Alice knows M1.
Let’s consider the security here. Can Alice know more than M1?
She would need to know K ′ which requires the knowledge of K0. Can
Bob know which one Alice has selected? He would need to differentiate
K and K ′ and find which one is the real key. But these two keys both
look like random strings.
While most of the above-mentioned results are established in 1980s,
SMC continues to be a very active research area in cryptography and
its applications begin to appear in many other disciplines. Recent
advances focus on better understanding of the security strength of
individual protocols and their composition, improving CSMC protocols
in terms of their computation complexity [28, 26] and communication
cost [6, 27, 1, 5], relating SMC to error correcting coding [14, 33], and
introducing SMC to a variety of applications [24, 11, 7, 4, 19, 20].
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2.2 Applications of SMC in image processing
The only work known to us in the application of SMC protocols on
image processing algorithms is by S. Avidan et al. [4]. They converted
the Viola-Jones type face detector [36] by rewriting the detector using
cryptographic primitives. Basically, a Viola-Jones type face detector is
a AdaBoost based detector combining a series of weak classifiers in a
’Cascade’ manner to form a strong classifier. Mathematically, the weak
classifiers are built on vector inner product between feature vector ex-
tracted and the classifier parameters followed by a thresholding on the
result. The only mathematical computation involved here are vector
inner product and thresholding. Hence, SMC protocols for vector inner
product and thresholding are formed by utilizing the oblivious transfer
(OT) primitive. In addition, the authors incorperate image hashing by
histograms of oriented gradients to accelerate the processing.
Since the feature vectors were extracted before the classifiers were
applied, the feature extraction process was not involved in the secure
detection stage, which tremendously reduced the computation burden.
However, as in our problems of image filtering and thrsholding, the
computation is on pixel-by-pixel basis. The sheer number of pixels in
common images requires far more computation than simply the classi-
fiers do. Therefore, it is impossible for us to employ the methods used
in [4].
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2.3 QIT Secure Inner Product
Du et. al. proposed a vector inner product protocol in 2004 [11],
which is the only known exsting inner product protocol that satisfies
our proposed security model. We briefly describe this protocol using
the pseudo-code InnerProductAlice and InnerProductBob listed be-
low. Alice has a m-dimensional vector x and Bob has a m-dimensional
vector y. They both know an invertible matrix P and its inverse
P−1. P is broken down into top and bottom halves T ∈ R⌊
n
2
⌋×n and
B ∈ R(n−⌊
n
2
⌋)×n, while P−1 into left and right halves L ∈ Rn×⌊
n
2
⌋ and
R ∈ Rn×(n−⌊
n
2
⌋). The inner product xTy can then be decomposed as
follows:
xTy = xTP−1Py = xTLTy + xTRBy (2.1)
Alice then sends xTR to Bob who computes xTRBy while Bob sends
Alice Ty so that she can compute xTLTy.
Algorithm 2 InnerProductAlice(x, P−1)
Require: x ∈ Rn. P−1 = (L R) is a n × n invertible matrix where n ≥ 2;
L ∈ Rn×⌊n/2⌋ and R ∈ Rn×(n−⌊n/2⌋).
1: x1 ← L
Tx
2: x2 ← R
Tx
3: Transmit x2 to Bob.
4: Receive y1 from Bob.
5: return x1
Ty1
The security of the protocol comes from the observation that xTR
and Ty project x and y into lower-rank subspaces, and thus the com-
ponents of the original vectors inside the null spaces of the matrices are
17
Algorithm 3 InnerProductBob(y, P )
Require: y ∈ Rn. P T = (T T BT ) is a n × n invertible matrix where n ≥ 2;
T ∈ R⌊n/2⌋×n and B ∈ R(n−⌊n/2⌋)×n.
1: y1 ← Ty
2: y2 ← By
3: Receive x2 from Alice.
4: Transmit y1 to Alice.
5: return x2
Ty2
irrecoverably lost. In [11], the authors proposed a design of P based
on decoding matrices used in error control coding so as to spread the
projections of the neighboring vectors as far as possible. Unlike the
OT procotol which requires complex long-integer modular exponentia-
tion and random key generation, this protocol requires only the highly
optimized matrix multiplications.
Although, technically speaking, linear filtering is just a series of
vector inner product, the above proposed method cannot be directly
applied. The reason is because of the overlapping between adjacent
vectors make the reverse engineering possible, and hence comprised
the security as was explained in Chapter 1.
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Chapter 3
Security Models
Following the convention used in cryptography, we refer the private
information as plaintext and the information exchanged among dis-
trusted parties as ciphertext. All existing cryptographic protocols are
based on one of the two security models – information theoretic security
and computational security. In the following sections, the definition of
these two security models will be breifly introduced. However, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, the two models are not suitable for pixel level
computation because either there are no solution (for information the-
oretic security) or it is too computationally expensive to be applied in
the pixel level applications (for computational security). Thus, a new
security model is proposed here and based on the proposed new secu-
rity model protocols to solve the linear convolution and thresholding
problems are designed and will be discussed in Chapter 4.
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3.1 Information Theoretic Security
A cryptosystem satisfies information theoretic security if its security
derives purely from information theory. That is, it makes no unproven
assumptions such as the hardness of mathematical problems such as
discrete logarithm, and is hence secure even when the adversary has
unbounded computing power [15].
The normally referred information theoretic security is also called
perfect security. Shannon originally formulated this security, though
defined in a different, but equivalent way [32]. Thus, Perfect Secrecy
is also sometimes called Shannon Secrecy.
DEFINITION 1. Let A be a cryptographic protocol, P be the plaintext set,
and C be the ciphertext set. ∀ x ∈ P, let y ∈ C be the corresponding
ciphertext. Let P (·) be the probability function. Then, A is said to
satisfy information theoretic security if
P (x|y) = P (x),
From the definition, we could see that information theoretic security
means the a posteriori probability of the plaintext being x, given that
the ciphertext y is observed, is identical to the a priori probability of
the plaintext being x, i.e. knowing y gives no help in knowing x.
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3.2 Computational Security
Unlike the information theoretic security, which makes no unproven
assumption of the hardness of some mathematical problems, Compu-
tational Security, also know in the cryptographic society as Semantic
Security makes necessary assumptions on the hardness of some mathe-
matical problems such as factoring and discrete logarithm for compu-
tationally bounded adversaries.
DEFINITION 2. Let P (·) be the probability function, and l(n) be any
polynomial over n. Then, a cryptographic protocol A is said to sat-
isfy computational security if for all polynomial-time algorithm G, and
large enough n0 ∈ N, ∀ n > n0,
P (G(y, n) = x) <
1
l(n)
,
Computational Security means given the ciphertext y and any pub-
lic information, no polynomial-time algorithm can compute the correct
plaintext x with a non-trivial probability. In another word, a crypto-
graphic protocol is Computationally Secure, if it is infeasible or takes
forever (long enough time in realistic) for a computationally bounded
adversary to derive significant information about the message (plain-
text) from the given ciphertext.
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3.3 Quasi Information Theoretic (QIT) Security
As popular as the above introduced security models, they are not
suitable for pixel level computation tasks as we are dealing with. In-
stead, we propose our new notion of security which is based on non-
invertible mappings. Hence, it is necessary to define non-invertibility
first.
DEFINITION 3. Let g : X → Y be a mapping from a probability sample
space1 X to another probability sample space Y. ∀ x ∈ X with P (x) >
0, define g−1 ◦ g(x) = { α | α ∈ X , g(α) = g(x), and P (α) > 0}.
1. Given α, β ∈ X with non-trivial probability, they are called QIT-
indistinguishable if g(α) = g(β).
2. Given x ∈ X with P (x) > 0, g−1 ◦ g(x) is called the QIT indistin-
guishable set of x under g.
3. g is called noninvertible, if the probability of finding a x ∈ X
whose QIT indistinguishable set has no element besides x is zero,
i.e. P
(
{ α | α ∈ X , |g−1 ◦ g(x)| < 2}
)
= 0. In particular,
we call g(x) N-noninvertible if the probability of finding a QIT
indistinguishable set smaller than N is zero.
Notice that given α ∈ g−1 ◦ g(x), there is no relative increase in the
knowledge about α and x based on y = g(x). This can be easily
1We assume the probability space discrete. If it is continuous, then X and Y will be the collection
of measurable sets.
22
shown by using the Bayes rule:
P (x|g(x) = y)
P (α|g(α) = y)
=
P (g(x) = y|x)P (x)/P (y)
P (g(α) = y|α)P (α)/P (y)
=
P (x)
P (α)
(3.1)
Any cryptographic protocol A can be viewed as a mapping from the
plaintext P to the ciphertext C. As such, we introduce the following
definition:
DEFINITION 4. A cryptographic protocol A satisfies called QIT security
if the underlying mapping A from plaintext space to ciphertext space is
non-invertible. A is N-QIT secure if the mapping is N-noninvertible.
It is obvious that the QIT security is weaker than the information
theoretic security as g can be any noninvertible mapping which can
certainly provide additional information about the plaintext x ∈ P
given the ciphertext y = g(x) ∈ C, i.e. P (x|y) > P (x). On the
other hand, based on Equation 3.1, the QIT model guarantees that
the relative relationship between two plaintexts x and α that map
to the same ciphertext y remains unchanged, though the individual
conditional probability may increase.
QIT security is also different from computational security. The
classic computational security model depends solely on the compu-
tational hardness of computing the plaintext x given the ciphertext
y = g(x). However, for a given y, it is guaruanteed that there is only
one x that satisfies g(x) = y. In QIT security, computing the QIT
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indistinguishable set g−1 ◦ g(x) of x for a given mapping if often quite
straightforward. However, the cardinality of g−1 ◦ g(x) could be large
and the true identity of x will remain hidden. It can also be seen from
Equation 3.1 that, if P (α) = P (x), then P (α|g(α)) = P (x|g(x)), i.e.
if the plaintext is uniformly distributed, the a posteriori probability is
also uniform within the QIT indistinguishable set of x. In this special
case, there is no algorithm that can distinguish between α and x.
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Chapter 4
Protocols
In this chapter, we will describe our protocols in detail of how to solve
the linear filtering and thresholding problem. Here we assume both
Alice and Bob are semi-honest, as defined in cryptography, i.e., both
parties are going to respect the protocol, but they are curious when
the protocol is finished, which means they are going to do whatever to
compute the other party’s information from what they have recieved
during the execution of the protocol. In addition, during the design
of the protocols, we assume that Bob is the server or the image pro-
cessing algorithm provider, who possesses more computational power
than Alice which is client or the image holder. As a result, we try to
assign the computational jobs to Bob whenever possible as long as it
does not detroy the security of the protocols.
4.1 Linear Filtering
In this section, we will develop two types of secure filtering protocol:
1) a two party protocol based on rank deficient matrix transform and
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2) a three-party protocol based on random permutation of the data.
Before we introducing the new protocols, we first review the classic
two-party protocol based on OT, the details of which is introduced in
Chapter 2.
4.1.1 Classical Two-party Solution
As introduced in Chapter 2, oblivious transfer allows Alice to select
one element from the whole dataset Bob holds without revealing to Bob
which element Alice has selected and without knowing any othe ele-
ment in the dataset rather than the one selected. Thus, a secure scalar
product protocol can be implemented based on the above-mentioned
property of oblivious transfer and is detailed in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 OTInnerProd(x,h)
Require: x,h ∈ Fm, F is some finite field and |F | = MF .
1: Bob computes for each hi a table of MF entries, where the j-th enthy of the table
is j · hi − ri and ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ m are the random numbers generated by Bob and
known only to him.
2: Alice and Bob engage in m rounds of OTMF1 protocols in which Alice selects the
j-th entry of the table in the i-th round if xi = j.
3: Alice takes the sum of the m quatities a =
∑m
i=1(xi·hi−ri) =
∑m
i=1 xi·hi−
∑m
i=1 ri.
4: Bob computes the sum of all ri’s, b =
∑m
i=1 ri.
Alice and Bob each hold a m-dimensional vector, and it is obvious
that after the protocol Alice and Bob each hold a number a and b as
described respectively and
a + b =
m
∑
i=1
xi · hi
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makes sure the correctness of the protocol and the property of Oblivi-
ous Transfer and randomness of ri’s guarantee the security of the whole
protocol.
4.1.2 QIT Two-party Solution
It may seem intuitive to implement secure linear filtering by apply-
ing the inner product algorithm [11] as described in Chapter 2 on Xw
row by row. However, it is not secure as adjacent rows in Xw overlap
with each other. As a result, the redundancy in the rank-reduced data
sent to Bob allows him to form a least-square estimation of the original
image. This least square problem involves solving a least-square data
matrix of size N⌊ (l+1)2 ⌋ × N . To achieve the QIT secrecy, Alice and
Bob need to carefully designed matrix P . The proposed protocol is
described below in Algorithm 5 and 6.
Algorithm 5 FilterAlice(Xw,m)
Require: Xw ∈ R
n×m, which is reformated from the original image.
1: Receive P−1 = (L R) from Bob.
2: X1 ← XwL.
3: X2 ← XW R.
4: Transmit X2 to Bob.
5: Receive h1 from Bob.
6: return X1h1
At the end of FilterAlice and FilterBob, Alice and Bob each
hold the quantity X1h1 and X2h2 respectively. The correctness of the
protocol can be easily tested by
X1h1 + X2h2 = XwLTh1 + XwRBh2 = XwP
−1Ph = Xwh. (4.1)
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Algorithm 6 FilterBob(h,m)
Require: h ∈ Rm×1.
1: Generate matrix L ∈ Rm×⌊
m
2
⌋ and form P−1 = (L R) ∈ Rm×m where R⊥L.
Computer P T = (T T BT ) under the constrain PP−1 = I, where I is the identity
matrix.
2: Send Alice the matrix P−1.
3: h1 ← Th.
4: h2 ← Bh.
5: Receive X2 from Alice.
6: Transmit h1 to Alice.
7: return X2h2
Algorithm 5 and 6 may seem similar to Algorithm 2 and 3 introduced
in Chapter 2. However, as discussed before because of the specialty of
linear convolution, the design of the matrix P should be different. We
do not give the form of P here and will leave the design together with
the proof of QIT security to the security analysis in Chapter 5.
Multiple stages of linear filtering are often used in image processing
such as separable filtering (horizontal and vertical filtering) or wavelet
transform (multiple stages of subband filtering). One advantage of our
designed protocol is that it can be directly applied to multiple stage
linear filtering.
4.1.3 QIT Three-party Solution
In this part, we will show how to implement the secure linear iflteirng
with the help of a third party Clark, who we assume will not collude
with either Bob or Alice. With the help of a third party, the protocol
for linear filtering can be made Information Theoretically Secure. On
the other hand, however, its application is comparatively limited as a
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non-colluding third party may not be always present. The basic idea is
that, instead of using matrix transforms, we randomly inject random
noise into the rows of Xw and h for each inner product operation. The
dependency between successive rows vanishes as random noise is used
each time.
The proposed protocol is shown Algorithm 7, 8, and 9. The problem
notation is the same as in Section 4.1.1 where Alice holds Xw and
Bob holds h and they want to jointly compute Xwh. Alice generates
a random n × m-dimensional matrix Xa and computes Xb = Xw −
Xa. Similarly, Bob generate a random m-dimensional vector ha and
compute hb = h− ha. Then the inner product can be rewritten as
Xwh = Xaha + Xahb + Xbha + Xbhb, (4.2)
Note Xa or Xb alone provides no information about Xw as proved
in Chapter 5. Neither does ha or hb alone about h. Unfortunately,
it is impossible for Bob and Alice to compute all the four items in
Equation 4.2 by just receiving one component of the vector from each
other. For example, if Alice sends Bob Xa, he can computer the first
and second terms rb = Xaha + Xahb. If then Bob send Alice ha,
Alice can then compute the fourth but not the third. To solve this
conundrum, we introduce a third party Clark. If Bob sends Alice
ha an Alice computes ra = Xbha, Alice and Bob can send Clark Xb
and hb so that Clark can compute the remaining term in Equation
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4.2, i.e. rc = Xbhb. Provided that no two parties collude with each
other, the information Alice, Bob and Clark have are all random data
which disclose no information about either Xw and h. Therefore, the
protocol does achieve Information Theoretic Security (Since the proof
is obvious, it is omitted in Chapter 5.).
Algorithm 7 3PartyInnerProductAlice(Xw)
Require: Xw ∈ R
n×m, which is reformated from the original image.
1: Generate random matrix Xa.
2: Xb ← Xw −Xa.
3: Transmit Xa to Bob.
4: Transmit Xb to Clark.
5: Receive ha from Bob.
6: return ra = Xbha
Algorithm 8 3PartyInnerProductBob(h)
Require: h ∈ Rm.
1: Generate random matrix ha.
2: hb ← hw − ha.
3: Transmit ha to Alice.
4: Transmit hb to Clark.
5: Receive Xa from Bob.
6: return rb = Xaha + Xahb
Algorithm 9 3PartyInnerProductClark()
1: Receive Xb from Alice.
2: Receive hb from Bob.
3: return ra = Xbhb
At the end of the protocol, Alice, Bob and Clark will have ra, rb,
and rc respectively such that the output image is y = ra + rb + rc.
The correctness of our protocol can be easily seen from Equation 4.2.
To perform a second stage filtering with, say Bob’ g, Clark can first
generate a random vector rc1, and send it to Alice, while on the other
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hand, send rc2 = rc − rc1 to Bob. Alice and Bob add the received
vector to the quantity they already hold to have r′a = rr + cc1 and
r′b = rb + rc2 respectively. Then we can simply apply the distribution
rule for convolution y ⊗ g = r′a ⊗ g + r
′
b ⊗ g. Since Bob knows r
′
b and
g, he can computer r′b⊗g himself. r
′
a⊗g can then be computed using
the three-party linear filtering protocol Among Alice, Bob, and Clark.
4.2 Thresholding
4.2.1 Classical Two-Party Solution
Research on secure thresholding problem in the cryptographic soci-
ety gave it a different name, called Secure Millionaire problem, though
essentially the same problem. Computationally secure protocols solv-
ing this problem was done by utilizing the concept of Oblivious Trans-
fer. The original solution to this problem is given by Andrew Yao
[37] in 1982. Shai Avidan used this protocol as part of his blind face
detection algorithm in [4].
Alice and Bob each hold a secrete number a and b respectively and
they want to compare who has a larger number. The classical solution
utilizing the OT primitive is to first have Alice and Bob individually
represent their number in binary format. The two numbers are then
checked through OT bit by bit from the highest significant bit (HSB)
to the lowest significant bit (LSB). Both parties will not know the final
answer until the LSB has been checked. For each bit, Bob prepares a
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look-up table based on his current bit and all the two possible values
of Alice’s bit. The details are shown in Algorithm 10 [4].
Algorithm 10 SecureMillionaire(a, b)
Require: a, b ∈ F , where F is some finite field. Suppose m-bit is long enough to
represent a and b, and let ai, bi be the i-th bit of a, b.
1: Bob defines three states {A,B, C}, which corresponding to Alice’s number is
larger, Bob’s number is larger, and the relationship is Undecided respectively.
For each round of communication, Bob encrypt the three states using a random
permutation of the numbers {1, 2, 3}.
2: For the Bob’s HSB bm, He constructs a 2-entry table from the following lookup
table.
bm = 0 bm = 1
am = 0 U B
am = 1 A U
The lookup table is built according to Bob’s possible bm and Alice’s possible am.
If bm = 0 Bob should extract the left column as the 2-entry table, otherwise, Bob
should use the right column.
3: Alice communicates with Bob through OT 21 to obtain the state sn according to
her am.
4: for i← m− 1 to 1 do
5: Bob construct a 6-entry table from the following lookup table which is indexed
by si+1 and ai.
bi = 0 bi = 1
si+1 = A ∧ ai = 0 A A
si+1 = B ∧ ai = 0 B B
si+1 = U ∧ ai = 0 U B
si+1 = A ∧ ai = 1 A A
si+1 = B ∧ ai = 1 B B
si+1 = U ∧ ai = 1 U U
where si+1 is the stata obtained from previous round of communication. If
Bob’s ai = 0 he should use the left column as the 6-entry table, otherwise he
should use the right column.
6: Alice communicates with Bob through OT 61 with the combination of si+1 and
ai as her index to obtain si from the table.
7: end for
8: Bob send Alice the meaning of the three states of s1 corresponding to the LSB
and Alice knows which number is larger.
9: If she wants, Alice can send the final result to Bob.
10: return Alice win, Bob win or Equal.
Note it is quite possible that in some intermediate bit, the relation-
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ship between a and b can be decided. However, if the protocol stops
right after the relationship is decided, given the round number, it will
leave much information about the opposite party’s number since both
of them knows the number they have. For example, if the relationship
is decided at the first round and Bob’s bm = 1, then he knows that
am = 0 for sure and Alice’s number cannot be larger than 2
m, which
is much different if at the last round Bob knows that he has a larger
number, then any number less than Bob’s b is possible for Alice’s a.
On the other hand, to prevent Alice from interpreting the meaning
of the states {A,B,U}, each round Bob should encrypt the three state
with a regenerated random permutation of the numbers {1, 2, 3}. For
example, if for the 1st round, Bob use 1 to represent the state A, at
the 2nd round after regeneration of the random permutation, he could
use 3 to represent the state A. Thus, as each round even after Alice
received a number from the set {1, 2, 3}, she won’t be able to know
which state the number represents.
4.2.2 QIT Two-Party Solution
Assume we have two distrusted parties: Alice and Bob. Alice holds
a secret scaler a, and Bob holds another secret scaler b. They want to
find out who has a bigger number without disclosing their private data.
Under our new notion of security, we propose to convert this problem
into a special polynomial evaluation problem. Let n be an even num-
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ber. Alice first randomly generates a (n− 1)th-degree polynomial f(x)
that has only one real root: Alice’s secret number a. In addition,
we require that the derivative of f(x) at a is non-negative. Alice can
easily generate this polynomial by first randomly selecting (n − 2)/2
complex conjugate numbers as the roots of the polynomial, and then
multiplying the resulting polynomial by a negative random number if
the derivative of f at a is negative or a positive random number oth-
erwise. We will refine this procedure for better security in Chapter 5.
The key property of f(x) is that for any b > a, we have f(b) > 0 and
for all b < a, we have f(b) < 0. An example of such a f(x) is shown
in Figure 4.1(a). Thus if Bob knows only the value of f(b) without
knowing the actual polynomial, he can easily solve the problem with-
out any knowledge of a. Given f(x) = an−1x
n−1 + · · · + a1x + a0, we
can evaluate f(b) as an inner product between two vectors x1 and x2:
f(b) , an−1b
n−1 + · · ·+ a1b + a0 , x
T
1 x2 (4.3)
where Alice has x1 = [ an−1 · · · a1 a0 ]
T and Bob has x2 = [ b
n−1 · · · b 1 ]T .
Thus, the evaluation of a polynomial becomes that of an inner prod-
uct. Our secure inner product evaluation is based on [11]. The idea
is to linearly map x1 and x2 into a lower-dimensional space such that
given the transformed results, it is impossible to exactly recover a and
b. We use an invertible matrix M ∈ Rn×n, and vertically divide it
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Figure 4.1: (a) Random polynomial with a single real root at a = 1. (b) Chebyshev’s
polynomials of degree one (blue solid), degree two (red dash), degree three (green
dast-dot) and degree four (black dot).
into two parts Ml ∈ R
n×k and Mr ∈ R
n×(n−k). On the other hand, we
horizontally divide M−1 into two parts Mt ∈ R
k×n and Mb ∈ R
(n−k)×n.
Well the readers may have noticed that we basicaly use the same
idea of matrix transformation for linear filtering and thresholding.
However, the notation of the transformation matrices are different.
The reason we use different notations is because the design of these
matrices are different for different problems. Hence, different notations
are used for better correspondences to Chapter 5 when we analyze the
security of the proposed protocols.
The design of M and its submatrices is critical to the security of
the protocol and the details will be discussed in Chapter 5. Given M
and the submatrices, our protocol of secure thresholding is described
in Algorithm 11 and 12.
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Algorithm 11 ThresholdingAlice(x1,M)
Require: x1 = [ an−1 · · · a1 a0 ]
T ∈ Rn. M = (Ml Mr) is a n×n invertible matrix
where n ≥ 2; Ml ∈ R
n×k and Mr ∈ R
n×(n−k).
1: x11 ← x
T
1 Ml
2: x12 ← x
T
1 Mr
3: Transmit x12 to Bob.
4: Receive x21 from Bob.
5: Send xT11x21 to Bob.
Algorithm 12 ThresholdingBob(x2,M
−1)
Require: c = [ bn−1 · · · b 1 ]T ∈ Rn. M−1 =
( Mt
Mb
)
is a n × n invertible matrix
where n ≥ 2; Mt ∈ R
k×n and Mb ∈ R
(n−k)×n.
1: x21 ←Mtx2
2: x22 ←Mbx2
3: Transmit x21 to Alice.
4: Receive x12 from Alice.
5: Receive xT11x21 from Alice.
6: Compute f(b) = xT12x22 + x
T
11x21
7: Return f(b) > 0.
The correctness of this protocol can be easily verified.
f(b) = xT1 x2
= xT1 MM
−1x2
= xT1
(
Ml Mr
)( Mt
Mb
)
x2
= xT11x21 + x
T
12x22
For a three-party case, given the non-colluding third party Clark,
the solution to this problem becomes obvious. Alice and Bob can just
send their numbers to Clark, and he compares the two number and
tell them who has a larger number.
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Chapter 5
Security Analysis
In this section, we will show that our proposed protocols (linear filter-
ing and thresholding) is QIT secure.
5.1 Linera Filtering Protocol
Under our assumption of semi-honest parties, the security of the
protocol depends solely on how much information Alice and Bob can
learn from the data they receive during the process of the protocol.
Let’s review Algorithm 5 and 6. Alice received h1 = Th from Bob, and
Bob received X2 = XwR from Alice. To satisfy our QIT security model,
by DEFINITION 3 and DEFINITION 4, it is enough to show that ∀Xw ∈
Rn×m, ∃X ′w ∈ R
n×m, where Xw and X
′
w are QIT indistinguishable
under the mapping function R, which is true iff R are noninvertable.
Yet on the other hand, we need also to have T be to noninvertible to
make the protocol QIT secure. The property of T to be rank deficient,
however, makes the statement automatically true, i.e. it is always QIT
secure for Bob.
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To make the protocol QIT secure for Alice, we need to consider
the essense of the problem, linear convolution. Remember Xw is con-
structed by sliding a window (size of the filter) across the image to
form rows of the matrix. Hence, Xw ∈ R
n×m cannot span the whole
space of Rn×m because of the overlapping between adjacent rows. To
simplify the problem, instead of a 2-D linear convolution, we will first
discuss a 1-D linear convolution.
For any 1-D discrete signal x(u), and a given filter h(v), let the
matrix after reformating x(u) be Xu ∈ R
n×m1 and the vector form of
h(v) be hv ∈ R
m×1. Then, the 1-D linear convolution can be written
into a matrix product form as
y = Xuhv. (5.1)
Then, for the Xu formed by 1-D discrete signal x(u), we have the
following theorem.
THEOREM 1. Let γ1, γ2, · · · , γd be d random numbers, and
L = span










1
γ1
...
γm−11










1
γ2
...
γm−12





· · ·





1
γ⌊m
2
⌋
...
γm−1⌊m
2
⌋










∈ Rm×d.
Let x(u) be any 1-D discrete signal and Xu be the matrix reformat-
ted from x(u) as in Equation 5.1. If R⊥L, then f(Xu) = XuR is
noninvertible for Xu.
1Boundary handling is not a concern of us.
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Proof Let Xu(µ, :) be the µ
th row of Xu.
Xu(µ, :) =





x(µ)
x(µ + 1)
...
x(µ + m− 1)





T
. (5.2)
Since
L = span










1
γ1
...
γm−11










1
γ2
...
γm−12





· · ·





1
γ⌊m
2
⌋
...
γm−1⌊m
2
⌋










∈ Rm×d.
and R⊥L, the vectors [1 γi · · · γ
m−1
i ], 1 ≤ i ≤ d are the left null space
vectors of R. Then we have
Xu(µ, :)R = Xu(µ, :)R + β1γ
µ
1





1
γ11
...
γm−11





T
R + · · ·+ βdγ
µ
d





1
γ1d
...
γm−1d





T
R.
(5.3)
Hence, if X ′u is the matrix reformatted by x
′(u) = x(u) + β1γ
u
1 + · · ·+
βdγ
u
d , from Equation (5.3), we know that
XuR = X
′
uR. (5.4)
As a result, x′(u) is in the QIT indistinguishable set of x(u) under
f(Xu) = XuR. Q.E.D.
Furthermore, we have the following corollary.
COROLLARY 1. For 1-D discrete signal x(u), If Q = (L R), where L
and R are as constructed in THEOREM 1, such that Q has an inverse
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and is denoted as Q−1, then Algorithm 5 and 6 are QIT secure under
the transformation matrix P = Q−1.
It is easy to see the correctness of COROLLARY 1. Hence, the proof
is omitted here.
For a 2-D image, the method to construct such P and P−1 is very
much similar to that in THEOREM 1. Therefore, we write it as another
corollary of THEOREM 1.
COROLLARY 2. Let x(µ, ν) and Xw be the image and corresponding
reformatted matrix, and h be the reformatted filter vector. The (iN +
j)th row of Xw is reformatted from the window





x(i, j) x(i, j + 1) · · · x(i, j + l2)
x(i + 1, j) x(i + 1, j + 1) · · · x(i + 1, j + l2)
...
... . . .
...
x(i + l1, j) x(i + l1, j + 1) · · · x(i + l1, j + l2)





,
such that
Xw(iN + j, :) =
















x(i, j)
...
x(i, j + l2)
...
...
...
x(i + l1, j)
...
x(i + l1, j + l2)
















(5.5)
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Let γ1, · · · , γd1 and η1, · · · , ηd2 be random numbers, and
L = span
































































1
γ1η1
...
γ1η
l2
1
...
...
γk1
γk1η1
...
γk1η
l2
1
...
...
γl11
γl11 η1
...
γl11 η
l2
1
































· · ·
































1
γiηj
...
γiη
l2
j
...
...
γki
γki ηj
...
γki η
l2
j
...
...
γl1i
γl1i ηj
...
γl1i η
l2
j
































· · ·
































1
γd1ηd2
...
γd1η
l2
d2
...
...
γkd1
γkd1ηd2
...
γkd1η
l2
d2
...
...
γl1d1
γl1d1ηd2
...
γl1d1η
l2
d2
































































∈ R(l1+1)(l2+1)×d1d2
(5.6)
Then if Q = (L R), where R⊥L, has an inverse and is denoted as
Q−1, then Algorithm 5 and 6 is QIT secure under the transformation
matrix P = Q−1.
Proof By the same rationale as in THEOREM 1, let
x′(µ, ν) = x(µ, ν) + β11γ
µ
1 η
ν
1 + · · ·+ βijγ
µ
i η
ν
j + · · ·+ βd1d2γ
µ
d1
ηνd2,
and the corresponding reformatted matrix be X ′w. Then, we know that
XwR = X
′
wR. (5.7)
Hence, x′(µ, ν) is in the QIT indistinguishable set of x(µ, ν) under the
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mapping f(Xw) = XwR, such that the algorithm is QIT secure to
Alice. Since the mapping for h automatically satisfies the QIT model,
we conclude that the algorithm is QIT secure to both parties. Q.E.D.
5.2 Threholding Procotol
To analyze how secure our thresholding protocol is, we need to find
out how much Alice and Bob can know from the data they send to
each other. First, let us consider the information Bob sent to Al-
ice. Bob sends Alice x21 = Mtx2. Since Mt is a k × n matrix and
x2 = [ b
n−1 · · · b 1 ]T , Mtx2 is equivalent to evaluating k different
polynomials at b, whose coefficients are defined by the row vectors of
Mt. The cryptosystem induced by Mt is m-QIT secure if and only if
there are at least m distinct values in the QIT indistinguishable set of
b. This is equivalent to saying that the (n − 1)th degree polynomials
with coefficients [Mt(i, 1) Mt(i, 2) . . . Mt(i, n− 1) Mt(i, n)− x(i)] for
i = 1, 2, . . . , k share m distinct roots. To maximize the security, we
would to have m as large as n − 1 which is the degree of the polyno-
mials. As shown below, this constraint impose a maximum value on
k, the number of rows in Mt, one can use. To show this, let us start
from the following lemma:
LEMMA 1. Given two polynomials g(x) and h(x) of degree n − 1 and
a scalar b. If equations g(x) = g(b) and h(x) = h(b) share exactly the
same roots, then g(x) = k1h(x)+k2, where k1 6= 0 and k2 are constants.
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Proof Since g(x) = g(a) and h(x) = h(a) share the same set of
roots, we have [g(x)−g(a)] = k1[h(x)−h(a)] or g(x) = k1h(x)+[g(a)−
k1h(a)] for some k1 6= 0. Set k2 = g(a) − k1h(a) and results follow.
Notice that as long as g(x) is not a constant, the coefficient vector of
f(x) is linear independent of the coefficient vector of g(x). Q.E.D.
THEOREM 2. If the proposed thresholding protocol is (n−1)-QIT secure
with respect to Bob, then the number of rows k in Mt is at most two.
Proof Since the full matrix M−1 invertible, the k row vectors of Mt
must be linearly independent. k is at least two based on LEMMA 1. If k
is larger than two, select any three row vectors and formulate the three
corresponding polynomials f1(x), f2(x) and f3(x). Using LEMMA 1, we
have f1(x) = k0f3(x) + k1 and f2(x) = k3f3(x) + k4. Thus, the co-
efficient vectors of both f1(x) and f2(x) lie in the subspace spanned
by the coefficient vector of f3(x) and [ 0 · · · 0 1 ]
T and we obtain a
contradiction. Q.E.D.
Next, we come to the actual design of Mt. Even though Alice may
not know the precise value of b, she can usually assume b to be within
a certain range. Without loss of generality, assume that b ∈ [−1, 1].
Thus, we need to find a polynomial g(x) such that for any b ∈ [−1, 1],
all the n − 1 roots of g(x) = g(b) are real and fall within the range
[−1, 1]. An example of such function is the (n−1)th order Chebyshev’s
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polynomial2: Tn−1(x) = cos[(n− 1) cos
−1(x)]. Figure 4.1(b) shows the
first four Chebyshev’s polynomials. We state the following fact without
proof about the Chebyshev’s polynomials though it is QITe obvious
based on the figure.
FACT 1. Except for at most n+1 distinct points within [−1, 1], the nth
order Chebyshev’s polynomial Tn(x) is n-noninvertible on [−1, 1]
The n+1 distinct points forms a measure-zero set in [−1, 1]. Thus,
the mapping Mtx2 will be (n − 1)-QIT secure to Bob if we can set
Mt =
(
C[Tn−1(x)]
C[k0Tn−1(x) + k1]
)
where the operator C[·] denotes the co-
efficient vector of a polynomial. Given Mt, we can easily compute Mb
by extending the two row vectors in Mt to a full set of basis in R
n.
We now show that the proposed thresholding protocol is also QIT-
secure to Alice. Bob receives x12 = x
T
1 Mr from Alice. Bob also knows
that x1 corresponds to the coefficient vector of a (n− 1)
th degree poly-
nomial f(x) with a single real root and non-negative derivative at that
root. To show that the protocol is QIT-secure to Alice, we need to
find x′1 that corresponds to a polynomial with the same features and
x12 = x
′T
1 Mr. Given Mt is defined based on the Chebyshev’s polyno-
mials, we have the following theorem:
THEOREM 3. Given that x1 is the coefficient vector of a polynomial
f(x) with only a single real root and non-negative derivative at that
2Though stated in its general form, Chebyshev’s polynomials can be easily computed as a true
polynomial based on the recurrence relation Tn+1(x) = 2xTn(x) − Tn−1(x) with T−1(x) = 0 and
T0(x) = 1.
44
root and Ml =
(
tT1
tT2
)
, there exists x′1 6= x1 such that x
′T
1 Mr = x
T
1 Mr
and x′1 corresponds to the coefficients of f
′(x) which also has a single
real root with non-negative derivative at that root.
Proof Recall that M−1 =
(
Mt
Mb
)
and M = (Ml Mr). Thus, Mt
and Mr relate to each other by the following relationship:
Mt ·Mr = 0
As Mr and Mt are a part of an invertible matrix, the rank of Mt is 2 and
the rank of Mr is n−2. Thus, if v
TMr = 0, v
T must be in the subspace
S spanned by the row vectors of Mt. Note that (x1 + v)
TMr = x
T
1 Mr.
Our strategy is to find an appropriate v that can satisfy the conditions.
On the other hand, the row vectors of Mt denote the coefficients of
the Chebyshev’s polynomial Tn−1(x) and k0Tn−1(x)+k1 for arbitrary k0
and k1 6= 0. It is obvious that the vector [ 0 · · · 0 1 ]
T is in the subspace
S. Define v = [ 0 · · · 0 ǫ/2 ]T where −ǫ is the largest local maximum
in (−∞, a] of Alice polynomial f(x). If no such local maximum exists,
ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily. The vector x′1 = x+v then corresponds to
a polynomial f ′(x) = f(x) + ǫ/2. Note that this polynomial still has
a single real root because the large local maximum on the left hand
side of the root is still ǫ/2 from zero. Furthermore, the derivative at
the root must be non-negative otherwise a local maxima would have
crossed the x-axis. Q.E.D.
In the unfortunate case when the largest local maximum left of a
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and the smallest local minimum right of a are both small, we can only
shift f(x) by a small amount before it starts to have more than one real
root. In other words, it is possible for Bob to roughly estimate a despite
the fact that the protocol is QIT-secure. The security, however, can
be significantly improved by imposing some constraints on the random
complex roots of f(x). Without loss of generality, we again assume
that Alice’s number a ∈ [−1, 1]. We have the following result:
THEOREM 4. The thresholding protocol is INFORMATION THEO-
RETICALLY secure to Alice if Alice first generates an auxiliary poly-
nomial
g(x) = (x− 1)
(n−2)/2
∏
i=1
(x− ci)(x− c̄i) (5.8)
with random ci under the constraint Real(ci) > 1 for all i and then let
f(x) = g(x)− g(a).
Proof For any real x, if we rewrite each term in Equation (5.8) in
polar form, the complex exponential terms for the conjugate roots will
cancel each other and g(x) will become
g(x) = sign(x− 1) · |x− 1| ·
(n−2)/2
∏
i=1
|x− ci| · |x− c̄i| (5.9)
Equation (5.9) shows that a) g(x) is negative for x < 1 and positive
for x > 1 and b) g(x) is strictly increasing or dgdx > 0 for x ≤ 1. This
is because as the real parts of all the complex roots are larger than
one, every modulus term in Equation (5.9) decreases as x approaches
1 from −∞. As sign(x − 1) is negative, g(x) is strictly increasing.
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Clearly f(x) = g(x) − g(a) for a ∈ [−1, 1] satisfies our requirements
of having a single real root and non-negative derivative at a. Recall
that the coefficient vector of f ′(x) = f(x) + c for any constant c is
in the null space of Mr. By choosing c ∈ [g(a), g(a) − g(−1)], f
′(x)
can have its single real root anywhere in [−1, 1]. Thus, based on the
information sent by Alice, Bob has no information about a and the
protocol is information theoretically secure to Alice. Q.E.D.
In closing, we have developed a linear filtering protocol that is
QIT security to both Alice and Bob, and a thresholding protocol that
achieves perfect security for Alice but leaks some information about
Bob’s secret number (only QIT secure).
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Chapter 6
Experiments and Discussion
In this chapter, we will show the experimental results and discuss some
possible problems of our proposed protocols.
6.1 Experimental Results
In this section, comparison of the time used between our proposed
protocols and the classic protocols will be presented. As will be seen,
our proposed protocols speed up the computation significantly.
6.1.1 Linear Filtering
Our proposed linear filtering protocol is computationally efficient as
expected compared with the classical OT based protocols. As a com-
parison, we have implemented a classic two-party protocol based on the
decription from [4], using our own 512-bit RSA public-key cryptosys-
tem (PKCS). We then compare its performance with the algorithm de-
scribed in Chapter 4 on a dual Wintel CPU (P4-3.4GHz) desktop with
1GB memory. The reason we did not test the classic protocol on real
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images is because it will take hours to do a linear filtering on a single
image. The oblivious transfer based technique takes about 20 minutes
to compute the inner product of two 20-dimensional vectors while our
two-party protocol uses only 30 milliseconds and our three-party pro-
tocol uses 47 milliseconds. Despite our non-optimal implementation of
the oblivious transfer protocol, its slow performance can be attributed
to the handling of very long integers in the encryption/decryption pro-
cess as well as the large amount of information exchanged between
Alice and Bob. For linear filtering using a 7 × 7 Gaussian mask on
the same computing platform, our two-party solution takes on average
0.7 seconds to denoise a 128× 128 image and our three party solution
takes around 0.6 seconds. We summarize the timing in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Average time used for linear filtering.
OT Based Two-party Three-party
Inner Product of 20-D vectors 20 minutes 30 milliseconds 47 milliseconds
Image Linear Filtering N/A 0.7 seconds 0.6 seconds
6.1.2 Thresholding
To compare the computational performance of the proposed thresh-
olding protocol with existing schemes, we use the cryptographic secure
millionaire protocol described in [4]. We have implemented both pro-
tocols in Matlab 7.0.1 on a Pentium 4 Dual Core 3.4GHz machine with
1GB memory. To ensure the validity of the protocols, the protocols
for Bob and Alice are run separately in two processes and the two
49
protocols exchange information using TCP/IP.
For the cryptographic protocol, Bob creates a series of tables by
bitwise comparing his secret number b with every possible value of
Alice’s secret number a, encrypts the tables using a public-key cipher,
and then transfers them to Alice. Alice decrypts the only entry of
the table that is corresponding to his own number a and extracts the
results. We have implemented our own 512-bit RSA public-key cipher
using the long-integer operations provided by the Maple kernel within
Matlab. We have run a series of comparison between random pairs of
64-bit floating point numbers. The average computation time per pair
on Bob’s side is 84.70 seconds. Excluding the time spent on network
operations, this number reduces to 83.73 seconds. The computation
times per pair for Alice are 10.72 seconds with networking and 10.43
without. Alice is faster because she does not need to generate large
tables. We have pre-generated a set of random public keys used in
the protocol and have excluded the time for key generation in the
measurement.
On the other hand, our proposed technique runs significantly faster.
On average, Alice takes 35.40 milliseconds with network and 1.31 mil-
liseconds without for each comparison. Bob takes 35.41 milliseconds
with network and 0.23 milliseconds without. Alice takes longer as she
needs to generate a 19th order random polynomial. Compared with the
cryptographic protocols, this is a factor of 104 improvement in com-
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putation time. In summary, we listed the timing of both protocols in
Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Average time used for thresholding.
Time Used
OT Based with Network 84.70 seconds
OT Based without Network 83.73 seconds
QIT with Network 35.40 milliseconds
QIT without Network 1.31 milliseconds
6.2 Discussion
Although our proposed protocols improve the computational time
significantly, there are still points that need to be further investi-
gated. One problem with our two-party linear filtering protocol is
on the discontinuities of the images (edges). Since as can be seen
in Chapter 5, for x(µ, ν) the QIT indistinguishable set is given by
x′(µ, ν) = x(µ, ν) + β11γ
µ
1 η
ν
1 + · · ·+ βijγ
µ
i η
ν
j + · · ·+ βd1d2γ
µ
d1
ηνd2. Notice
that βijγ
µ
i η
ν
j is continuous for i, j. Therefore, the discontinuity points
is contributed soly by x(µ, ν). This is a possible weak point of leaking
edge information about the image, which sometimes is very important.
One possible remedy of this problem is to use original inner product
protocol in [11], but before applying it, Alice need to random permute
the rows of Xw as is proposed in [19]. This, however, arises another
problem as the security of this protocol is still kept unproven.
Another problem is about the proposed thresholding protocol. At
the end of the protocol, Alice or Bob needs to send her/his share to the
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opposite side. Definitely, Bob cannot send his share to Alice, because
Alice generated the polynomial f(x), and if given Bob’s share, Alice
will know the value of f(b), then she will know what b is simply by
solving the equation f(x) = f(b). This will tell everything about Bob’s
b. Hence, the only possible way is to have Alice send her share to Bob,
and let Bob know f(b). We know that Alice’s f(x) is transformed by
matrix Mt and Mb, then it is decomposed to f(x) = fb(x)+ft(x), where
fb(x) is the polynomial in the space spanned by Mb and ft(x) in the
space spanned by Mt. Receiving x12 = x
T
1 Mr and x
T
11x21 = x
T
1 MlMtx2
from Alice, Bob can estimate fb(x) and ft(x) respectively. Thus, the
perfect secrecy for Alice is compromised.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis, we proposed a novel security model called Quasi Informa-
tion Theoretic (QIT) model. Compared with the two existing classical
cryptographic security models, namedly Information Theoretic Secu-
rity and Computational Security, our proposed model provides less
security than the former model in the information sense while enable
us to develop protocols that are significantly faster than those under
the latter model. Under the proposed QIT security model, protocols
to solve two problems, linear filtering and thresholding, are developed.
The rigorous analysis of the security of the protocols for both parties
were also presented. The experimental results showed that our pro-
posed protocols improved the computational time largely. While there
are some potential insecure point in our proposed protocols as is dis-
cussed in Chapter 6, we need further improvement and analysis in the
future. Other future work includes extending the QIT framework to
more signal and image processing algorithms.
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